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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the acceptance of different gain sharing 
methods in practice. In addition, the influence of behavioural aspects on the acceptance of these 
allocation methods is observed.  
Design/methodology/approach – In order to investigate the research question, a behavioural study 
is conducted in form of online surveys. The online surveys are performed with manufacturers, 
logistics service providers (LSPs) and retailers from the Dutch fast moving consumer goods (FMCG) 
industry. Further, a control group consisting of students is used in order to investigate potential 
cognitive biases of business practitioners. 
Findings – Results indicate that the acceptance of a gain sharing method depends on the information 
availability and cognitive biases. Further, due to a different influence of information availability and 
varying cognitive biases no gain sharing methods is preferred by all involved parties. 
Practical implications –The major barrier for the implementation and the success of a SCC is a fair 
allocation method which is accepted by all parties involved in the SCC. One practical implication of 
this study to overcome this barrier is to provide each party individually all relevant information.  
Originality/value – The study extends the work by Cruijssen et al. (2007a) as well as Leng and Parlar 
(2009) and provides novel insights in the understanding of the acceptance of gain sharing methods 
through the investigation of the acceptance levels and the integration of behavioural decision-
making literature. 
 
1. Introduction  
Due to a constantly growing competition among organizations and higher customer expectations, in 
the last decades, companies started to realize the need for supply chain collaboration (SCC) (Cao and 
Zhang, 2011; Lambert et al. 1996; Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002). Nowadays, SCC is a widely 
discussed topic which can be defined as "two or more independent companies work jointly to plan 
and execute [...] operations with greater success than when acting in isolation" (Simatupang and 
Sridharan, 2002).   
According to Defryn et al. (2016), the main motivation for parties to start a SCC is the lower coalition 
costs compared to their stand-alone costs. This is stressed by the research by Jung et al. (2017a; 
2017b). They interviewed companies from the Dutch fast moving consumer goods (FMCG) industry 
to investigate relevant drivers and resistors for starting SCCs. In their study "cost reduction" is the 
dominant motivation factor for parties to start SCCs. By reducing costs through SCC, a so-called 
coalition gain is achieved. The coalition gain represents the difference between the coalition costs 
and the stand-alone costs. One main challenge in collaborations is the division of the coalition gain 
among the parties (Defryn et al., 2016; Vanovermeire et al., 2014b). According to Cruijssen et al. 
(2007a), in horizontal collaborations the fair distribution of the coalition gain even represents the 
major barrier for the implementation of SCCs. In the context of vertical SCC, Leng and Parlar (2009) 
confirm the importance of a fair allocation method for the parties to stay in the SCC. If one party is 
not satisfied with its allocated share or has the feeling that it does not get a fair portion of the 
coalition gain, future SCCs are less likely to occur (Jap, 2001). Cruijssen et al. (2007b) also mention 
that mistrust about the fairness of the applied allocation method caused already many failures of 
SCCs. This is stressed by Cruijssen (2012) who states that having a fair allocation method, which is 
also perceived as fair by the parties, is essential for a successful SCC. In order to solve this problem, 
researchers developed different so-called gain sharing methods to allocate the coalition gain among 
all parties participating in the collaboration (Vanovermeire et al., 2014b). The general idea of these 
gain sharing methods is to distribute the gains in such a way that everyone is satisfied to ensure the 
establishment and sustainability as well as to realize the potential of the SCC (Liu et al., 2010). 
Although, Cruijssen et al. (2007a) as well as Leng and Parlar (2009) outline the importance of the 
acceptance of a gain sharing method by all parties for the implementation and the success of a SCC, 
until now the actual acceptance levels of gain sharing methods have not been investigated. 
Therefore, in this paper the work by Cruijssen et al. (2007a) as well as the work by Leng and Parlar 
(2009) is extended through the investigation of the acceptance of selected gain sharing methods in 
practice.   
Moreover, aspects that might have an influence on the acceptance levels of these gain sharing 
methods are observed. For a long time, the predominant assumption in economics was that human 
beings are rational thinking agents, which implies the decisions are made in a rational and consistent 
way (Sterman, 1989). However, human beings are bounded due to limitations in available time, 
information and cognitive capabilities (Simon, 1979). They tend to rely on heuristics or cognitive 
biases to deal with complex problems (Schenk, 2011). Until now, limited research has been published 
in the logistics and supply chain management (SCM) literature dealing with the influence of human 
behaviour, judgment and decision-making. However, decision-makers are human beings. To ensure 
practical validity it is necessary to incorporate behavioural research in studies (Tokar, 2010). This is 
stressed by Mantel et al. (2006) who outline the greater understanding of decisions made in SCM by 
integrating decision-making behaviour literature with SCM literature. In this paper, the behavioural 
decision-making literature is considered by investigating the influence of different behavioural 
aspects on the acceptance of gain sharing methods.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, different gain sharing methods are 
outlined and the behavioural decision-making literature is discussed. Next, the acceptance of 
selected gain sharing methods as well as the influence of behavioural aspects on the acceptance 
levels of these allocation methods is investigated through a behavioural study. The research 
methodology is further detailed in Section 3. In Section 4, the statistical analysis and the results are 
presented, followed by a discussion in Section 5. Moreover, the contribution to the SCM literature is 
explained, valuable practical implications are provided and directions of further research are 
outlined. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Gain Sharing Methods 
In literature two kinds of allocation methods exist, gain sharing methods and cost allocation 
methods. Gain sharing methods are used if the gain is split among the parties, whereas, cost 
allocation methods are applied if the total costs of the SCC are divided among the parties (Defryn et 
al., 2016). Until now a wide range of possible allocation methods ranging from straightforward rules 
of thumbs to game theory based methods have been proposed and applied either as a gain sharing 
method or a cost allocation method (Vanovermeire et al., 2014a).    
One of the most well-known game-theoretical methods is the Shapley value, introduced by Shapley 
(1953). The Shapley value has already been applied as a gain sharing method by Vanovermeire et al. 
(2014b) to a horizontal SCC in the FMCG industry. In addition, Frisk et al. (2010) used the Shapley 
value to allocate the costs in the forest transportation industry. Another well-known game-
theoretical allocation method is the Nucleolus, introduced by Schmeidler (1969). The Nucleolus has 
been applied as a gain sharing and a cost allocation method as well. Vanovermeire et al. (2014a) 
discuss the Nucleolus as a cost allocation method and apply it to collaborative transport settings. Liu 
et al. (2010) apply this method to a SCC between Less-Than-Truckload carriers in order to allocate the 
collaborative gain. Tijs and Driessen (1986) discuss an allocation method that first divides the costs in 
a separable and non-separable part. The separable part is directly linked and assigned to a specific 
party. The remaining costs, the non-separable part, have to be divided among the parties. Tijs and 
Driessen (1986) mention different ways of how the non-separable part of the costs can be allocated. 
They discuss the equal charge method (ECM), the alternative cost avoided method (ACAM) and the 
separable cost remaining benefits (SCRB). They also introduce a new method, the cost gap method 
(CGM). Furthermore, Frisk et al. (2010) introduce and apply the equal profit method (EPM), where 
the maximum difference between the relative savings of two parties is minimized. Liu et al. (2010) 
propose an allocation method which is called the weighted relative savings model (WRSM) and apply 
it next to the Shapley value to the SCC between Less-Than-Truckload carriers.  
The above mentioned allocation methods are all game-theoretical based methods. In practice simple 
methods are often preferred, which is most likely due to the fact that game-theoretical allocation 
methods are more difficult to understand, more complicated to compute and more data are required 
(Leng and Parlar, 2005). One simple method is the equal allocation of the coalition gain among the 
parties (Jap, 2001). Next to the equal allocation, methods where the weight for each party is 
determined based on e.g. the volume (i.e. the number of pallets, the total weight...) are often used in 
practice. Another possibility is to determine the weight according to the stand-alone costs 
(Vanovermeire et al., 2014a). 
 
2.2 Behavioural Decision-Making 
For a long time, the predominant assumption in economics was that humans are rational thinking 
agents. However, Simon (1979) describes a bound on rational decision-making due to limitations of 
available time, information and cognitive capabilities of the decision-makers. Although people think 
that they are rational thinking creatures, our thinking, our memory and also our decision-making are 
influenced by cognitive biases. Until now, a wide range of cognitive biases have been identified. 
Among these is the recency bias, where people tend to put more weight on the latest information 
they get (Hallowell and Gambrese, 2010). Another example is the so-called salience bias, where 
human beings tend to focus on the most easily-recognizable items or information of a concept and 
ignore the once which are not that visible (Schenk, 2011). The choice-supportive bias is a bias, where 
people tend to feel positive about something they choose, even if the choice has a flaw (Mather and 
Johnson, 2000). As a final example, the framing effect bias is named. According to de Martino et al. 
(2006), human beings are remarkable vulnerable to the manner in which the options are presented, 
which is the so-called framing effect. Therefore, when facing consequentially identical decision 
problem people's decisions may be contrary depending on how the options are presented; in a 
positive, in terms of gains, or in a negative, in terms of losses, "frame". A popular example is the 
"Asian disease problem" described by Tversky and Kahneman (1981). They find out that decision-
makers tend to avoid risk when information on gains and losses are presented in a positive frame but 
the same decision-maker is willing to take a greater risk once the information is presented in a 
negative frame.  
3. Research Procedure 
In this paper, a behavioural study in form of online surveys is performed in order to investigate the 
acceptance levels of different gain sharing methods. Moreover, the influence of behavioural aspects 
on the acceptance levels of these allocation methods is observed. Behavioural studies are a well-
established research method for studying human factors (Bendoly et al., 2005).  
The research procedure is divided into four different steps. In Table 1, the main aspects for each of 
these steps are outlined.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Research procedure 
 Procedure Comments Reference 
Step 1 Variable Selection Independent Variables 
Gain sharing method (Nucleolus, Shapley value, 
Weighted charge method – Power/Initiator, ECM) 
Information availability (Phase 1, Phase 2, Phase 3) 
Perspective (Manufacturer, LSP, Retailer) 
 
Dependent Variable 
Acceptance 
Section 3.1 
Step 2 Data collection • Participants evaluate whether to accept or 
reject a certain gain share for each of the 
five gain sharing methods in each of the 
three phases  
• Only outcomes (ordered from the lowest to 
the highest) are presented, it is not 
mentioned which method is applied 
 
Section 3.2 
Step 3 Population and 
Sample Selection 
Business Practitioners 
Population: Companies from the Dutch FMCG 
industry and participants in a specific logistics 
competition 
Sample Size: 4 manufacturers, 4 LSPs, 4 retailers 
 
Control Group 
Population: Students from Maastricht University 
Sample Size: 51 bachelor and master students (17 
manufacturers, 17 LSPs, 17 retailers) 
Section 3.3 
Step 4 Data Analysis Research Question 
What are the acceptance levels of different gain 
sharing methods and what is the influence of 
different behavioral decision-making aspects on the 
acceptance levels of these allocation methods? 
 
Analysis Tool 
Binary logistic regression; binary logistic regression 
with penalized maximum likelihood estimation  
 
Independent Variables 
Gain sharing method (Method): Categorical variable 
– Baseline: Nucleolus 
Information availability (Phase): Categorical variable 
– Baseline: Phase 1 
Perspective (Type): Categorical variable – Baseline: 
Manufacturer 
 
Dependent Variable 
Acceptance: Binary variable 
Section 3.4 
 
3.1 Variable Selection 
In the study, the influence of three aspects - gain sharing method, information availability and 
perspective - on the acceptance of different gain sharing methods is investigated. These aspects are 
outlined in more detail in the next sections.  
 
3.1.1 First Aspect: Gain Sharing Method 
First, the influence of the gain sharing method, which represents the first variable, is investigated. 
The gain sharing method determines the gain which is assigned to each party. As these differ among 
the gain sharing methods, the level of acceptance of the methods are most likely different which 
might uncover possible cognitive biases. In this research, the focus is on four different gain sharing 
methods; the Shapley value, the Nucleolus and two methods based on separable and non-separable 
costs, the weighted charge method (WCM) and the ECM. For the WCM two different weights are 
chosen. Therefore, in total five different gain sharing methods are investigated. The first two 
allocation methods are well-known game-theoretical based methods and the most preferred 
methods in theory (Moulin, 1988). The last two allocation methods are most similar to what is 
already used in practice. This is based on a preliminary study, which has been conducted with 20 
companies from the Dutch FMCG industry, the industry under consideration in the survey. In 
Appendix A, the questionnaire of this preliminary study is shown and information about data 
collection is provided.   
Shapley Value   
For the Shapley value the formation of the grand-coalition 𝑁, which includes every party of the SCC, 
can be seen as a sequential process, where the parties of the SCC enter one by one. For every party 𝑖, 
the value is defined as the average marginal contribution of the party to every possible sub-coalition 
𝑆 of the grand-coalition containing this party. The Shapley value is based on the four axioms 
formulated by Shapley (1953) and can be computed by: 
 
𝑥𝑖 = ∑
|𝑆|! (|𝑁| − |𝑆| − 1)!
|𝑁|!
∗ (𝑐(𝑆⋃𝑖) − 𝑐(𝑆))
𝑆⊂𝑁\𝑖
 
𝑥𝑖 = the allocated gain for party 𝑖 
𝑁 = the grand-coalition (all parties included)   
𝑆 = a sub-coalition  
|𝑁|, |𝑆| = the number of parties in a grand-coalition and sub-coalition, respectively  
𝑐(𝑆) = the costs of sub-coalition 𝑆  
Nucleolus   
The Nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) is based on the idea to minimize the maximum excess. The excess 
is the gain the parties in a sub-coalition 𝑆 obtain if they exit the grand-coalition 𝑁. For a sub-coalition 
𝑆 given an allocation 𝑥 the excess is denoted as: 
𝑒(𝑥, 𝑆) = 𝑐(𝑆) − ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑖∈𝑆
 
𝑒(𝑥, 𝑆) = the excess for a sub-coalition 𝑆 given an allocation 𝑥    
𝑆 = a sub-coalition  
𝑥𝑖= the allocated gain for party 𝑖   
𝑐(𝑆) = the costs of the sub-coalition 𝑆  
Weighted Charge Method   
The WCM is based on the idea of Tijs and Driessen (1986) that the costs are at first split in a 
separable ( 𝑚𝑖 = 𝑐(𝑁) − 𝑐(𝑁\𝑖 ))  and a non-separable part (𝑐(𝑁) −  ∑ 𝑚𝑗𝑗 ). The non-separable 
part is divided among the parties according to some specific weight 𝑤𝑖. The allocation portion for a 
party 𝑖  is then computed as follows: 
 𝑥𝑖 =  𝑚𝑖 +  (𝑐(𝑁) −  ∑ 𝑚𝑗
𝑗
) ∗ 𝑤𝑖   
 𝑥𝑖 = the allocated gain for party 𝑖   
 𝑚𝑖 = the separable part of the gain for party 𝑖 and 𝑗, respectively  
 𝑁 = the grand-coalition (all parties included)   
 𝑐(𝑁} = the costs of the grand-coalition 𝑁  
 𝑤𝑖 = specific weight for party 𝑖   
Based on the preliminary study (Appendix A) two different kinds of weights have been identified, one 
based on the power position and one based on the initiator. In the Dutch FMCG industry the retailer 
is the most powerful party. Therefore, the highest weight with 𝑤𝑟=0.5 is assigned to the retailer. In 
comparison to the manufacturer the LSP is more powerful, therefore, a weight of 𝑤𝑙=0.3 is assigned 
to the LSP and the rest 𝑤𝑚=0.2 is assigned to the manufacturer. Further, in the Dutch FMCG industry 
often the LSP initiates to start the SCC. Therefore, the highest weight with 𝑤𝑙=0.4 is assigned to the 
LSP. The rest is equally split among the manufacturer and the retailer.  
Equal Charge Method   
The ECM is also based on the idea of Tijs and Driessen (1986). In contrast to the WCM, the non-
separable part is equally distributed among the parties. Therefore, the total amount allocated to 
each party 𝑖 is: 
  𝑥𝑖 =  𝑚𝑖 +
𝑐(𝑁) −  ∑ 𝑚𝑗𝑗
|𝑁|
      
 𝑥𝑖 = the allocated gain for party 𝑖   
 𝑚𝑖  = the separable part of the gain for party 𝑖 and 𝑗, respectively  
 𝑁 = the grand-coalition (all parties included)   
 |𝑁| = the number of parties in a grand-coalition  
 𝑐(𝑁) = the costs of the grand-coalition 𝑁  
 
3.1.2 Second Aspect: Information Availability 
Second, the influence of the information availability, which represents the second variable, is 
investigated. This behavioural decision-making aspect refers to the limitation of available information 
outlined by Simon (1979) in the context of bounded rationality. Human beings make their decisions 
based on cognitive biases when available information is limited (Sterman, 1989). In order to 
investigate the influence of available information, three different phases are developed, where the 
amount of information increases with each phase. In the first phase, the participants only get the 
information about their own financial consequences. This includes information about their expected 
benefits, the costs related to the SCC and the resulting expected profit, which is equal to the 
contribution they make to the coalition gain, see Table 2. Moreover, they get the information about 
the gain they will get according to each of the five different gain sharing methods, see Table 3. In the 
second phase, the participants also get the information about the financial consequences of the 
other parties in the supply chain. In the last phase, market information for each party of the SCC is 
included. Here information about the market share, the products and the importance of a 
relationship with the party is included, see Figure 1.  
 
 Table 2: Information about the financial consequences after a five year SCC 
 Manufacturer/ Party A LSP/ Party B Retailer/ Party C 
Benefits 80,000 € 50,000 € 250,000€ 
Costs 85,000 € 10,000 € 80,000 € 
Profits - 5,000 € 40,000 € 170,000 € 
 
 Table 3: Gain assigned to the different parties according to the gain sharing methods 
 Manufacturer/ Party A LSP/ Party B Retailer/ Party C  
Nucleolus 4,333.33 € 55,333.33 € 145,333.33 € 
Shapley 36,333.33 € 61,833.33 € 106,833.33 € 
WCM-Power 41,000.00 € 61,500.00 € 102,500.00 € 
WCM-Initiator 61,500.00 € 82,000.00 € 61,500.00 € 
ECM 68,333.33 € 68,333.33 € 68,333.33 € 
 
Figure 1: Market information for each party 
 3.1.3 Third Aspect: Perspective 
Third, the influence of the perspective, which represents the third variable, is investigated. The 
behavioural study focuses on a vertical SCC between one manufacturer, one LSP and one retailer. 
Different parties in the SCC have different information and, therefore, most likely show different 
cognitive biases (Sterman, 1989).  
  
3.2 Data collection 
For data collection, an online survey is conducted. The strong methodology control is the main 
reason to use an online survey. In an online survey the order of the questions, the completeness of 
the answers and the filtering can be controlled by the researcher (Evans and Mathur, 2005). The 
participants are asked in each phase of information availability and for each of the five gain sharing 
methods to evaluate whether they would accept or reject the assigned gain. Thereby, the question 
order from Phase 1 to Phase 3 is necessary in order to observe the influence of available information. 
The participants only see the outcomes of the gain sharing method but they do not know which 
method is applied. Therefore, the acceptance of the gain sharing method is investigated through the 
acceptance of the specific outcome. The outcomes are ranked from the lowest to the highest in 
order to prevent parties rejecting an outcome which is lower than one before. Another important 
advantage of the online survey is that participants cannot look ahead like in a mail survey. However, 
in such a situation the questionnaire might appear to have an endless number of questions which 
might keep a respondent from continuing the online survey (Evans and Mathur, 2005). In order to 
prevent this, a graphical progress indicator is used. The predetermined order and the prevention of 
looking ahead to later questions reduce the survey bias. Moreover, through the use of an online 
survey and not a personal survey or a telephone survey the so-called interview bias is avoided which 
can always occur when there is a personal contact between the interviewer and the respondent 
(Evans and Mathur, 2005). The goal of the online survey is to inter alia observe cognitive biases, 
therefore, the prevention of biases resulting out of the surveys is very important. Furthermore, split 
samples are used. The online surveys differ per party of the SCC. According to Evans and Mathur 
(2005), "online surveys are particularly effective when multiple samples are involved". 
The online surveys are distributed through a link to the survey URLs in an e-mail. Reminders are sent 
out to achieve a higher response rate. An example of the online survey can be found in Appendix B.  
 
3.3 Population and Sample Size Selection 
The online surveys are conducted with managers of companies from the Dutch FMCG industry. This 
industry is selected because of the importance of SCCs for this industry (de Kok et al., 2015). In the 
FMCG industry it is necessary for parties to collaborate with their supply chain partners. To ensure 
sustainable SCCs, all parties have to be satisfied with and accept their assigned gain share. The 
participants are selected from a population of 26 companies participating in a logistic competition in 
the Netherlands. The sample size is 12 including four manufacturers, four LSPs and four retailers.     
Next to this sample of business practitioners, a control group is taken into account. A control group is 
used for experiments to identify special aspects of the experiment group (Bailey, 2008). In this paper, 
by using a control group the cognitive biases of the business practitioners outlined in Section 3.1 
should be identified. The control group consists of students from Maastricht University. Students are 
chosen due to their sufficient knowledge to understand the situation but limited experiences in 
working in the industry. Out of this population, a sample size of 51 students is randomly selected. 
These students are randomly assigned to the three different parties without knowing which role they 
take. To this end, the manufacturer is replaced by party A, the LSP by party B and the retailer by 
party C.  
  
3.4 Data Analysis 
To analyse the acceptance levels of selected gain sharing methods as well as the influence of 
behavioural aspects, particularly the information availability and cognitive biases, on the acceptance 
levels of these allocation methods, a binary logistic regression is performed (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 
2000). In order to use the logistic regression some data preparations have to be made. The 
dependent variable is a binary variable getting a value equal to 1, if the gain is accepted and 0, 
otherwise. The three independent variables are all categorical variables. The gain sharing method 
variable is coded as "Nucleolus", "Shapley", "WCM-Power", "WCM-Initiator" and "ECM". Taken the 
Nucleolus as a baseline, the gain sharing variable is represented by four binaries. To represent the 
five different gain sharing methods only four design variables are needed due to an intercept used in 
the model (Homser and Lemeshow, 2000). Information availability is represented by two variables 
with Phase 1 designated as the reference phase. The perspective is also represented by two variables 
and the manufacturer is taken as the reference category.  
For the business practitioners, problems with the logistic regression occurred as a consequence of 
the data pattern known as quasi-complete separation. Quasi-complete separation occurs if the 
dependent variable of an independent dummy variable is always either equal to 1 or to 0. As a 
consequence, the maximum likelihood estimate does not exist. This problem often occurs if a small 
sample size is used (Allison, 2008) as it is the case for the business practitioners. Therefore, for the 
business practitioners a binary logistic regression with penalized maximum likelihood estimation is 
used. The penalized maximum likelihood estimation method has been proposed by Firth (1993) to 
reduce the bias in maximum likelihood estimates. Heinze and Schemper (2002) show that this 
method provides a solution for the quasi-complete separation problem. The basic idea of the 
penalized maximum likelihood estimation method is to introduce a modified score function which 
removes the bias of the maximum likelihood estimates of the coefficients (Firth, 1993). For a more 
elaborate explanation of this method, the reader is referred to Firth (1993) and Heinze and Schemper 
(2002).  
Both binary logistic regressions are performed using R (version 3.3.2). For the binary logistic 
regression with the penalized maximum likelihood estimation method the package logistf and for the 
normal binary logistic regression the function glm() is used. The package logistf uses as a default the 
penalized log likelihood ratio test. As this method is also recommended by Heinze and Schemper 
(2002) for the binary logistic regression with maximum likelihood estimation, the penalized log 
likelihood ratio test is used. For the binary logistic regression the Wald test is used as an inferential 
statistical test which is the default used by the glm()-function.   
The data analysis starts with a multicollinearity test. Based on the results of the multicollinearity tests 
the binary logistic regressions are performed. At first, the influence of all three independent variables 
on the acceptance levels of different gain sharing methods is investigated. This is followed by the 
analysis of the influence of aspects on the acceptance level of each party separately. Therefore, three 
additional logistic regressions, one for the manufacturers, one for the LSPs and one for the retailers, 
are performed to inter alia identify specific cognitive biases for each party. All logistic regressions are 
performed for the business practitioners and the control group. Through an extensive comparison 
between the different logistic regressions, acceptance levels of different parties and behavioural 
aspects are identified. In Figure 2 an overview of the procedure of the data analysis is presented. 
 Figure 2: Procedure of the data analysis 
 
3. Statistical Analysis and Results 
In the following the statistical analysis and the results are presented. At first, the results for the 
multicollinearity test are presented. This is followed by the outcomes of the logistic regression where 
the influence of all independent variables on the acceptance levels is observed. Next, the results for 
each of the three parties separately are shown. As of now, a significance level of 5 % is taken as the 
standard significance level. 
 
4.1 Multicollinearity 
One common problem when using multiple independent variables in a logistic regression is the 
occurrence of correlation among independent variables. When two independent variables are highly 
correlated, the problem known as multicollinearity occurs. Multicollinearity can seriously distort the 
interpretation of the model (Greene, 2003). Table 4 shows an example for the correlation matrix of 
business practitioners’ logistic regression. All correlation coefficients have small values (≤ 0.5) 
indicating no problems with multicollinearity. Appendix C contains all other correlation matrices. The 
correlation coefficients for all other logistic regressions are small as well. Therefore, all independent 
variables are included in the logistic regressions. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Correlation matrix of the regression of the business practitioners 
 
 
4.2 Regression 
In Figure 3 the acceptance levels of the three parties over all gain sharing methods and phases are 
displayed for the business practitioners and the control group. Differences between the business 
practitioners and the control group can be observed. The total acceptance level of the business 
practitioners with 54.44 % is significantly lower than the acceptance level of the control group with 
64.44 % even on a 1 % significance level. Looking at each party individually, for both groups the LSPs 
show the highest acceptance rate and the retailers the lowest. For the control group, the 
manufacturers and the retailers show a higher acceptance level and the LSPs a slightly lower one 
compared to the business practitioners. Therefore, the differences between the parties are larger for 
the business practitioners. Nevertheless, for both groups a significant difference in the acceptance 
levels of the LSPs and the retailers compared to the manufacturers is observed on a 1 % significance 
level, see Table 5. Moreover, for both groups the coefficient of the LSPs is positive. Therefore, in 
comparison to the baseline, the manufacturers, the LSPs have a significantly higher acceptance level 
on a 1 % significance level. On the contrary, the retailers show for both groups a negative coefficient 
indicating a significantly lower acceptance level in comparison to the manufacturers even on a 1 % 
significance level.    
 
 Phase 
1 
Phase 
2 
Phase 
3 
Nucleo- 
lus 
Shapley WCM-
Power 
WCM-
Initiator 
ECM Manufac-
turer 
LSP Retailer 
Phase 1 1.00 -0.50 -0.50 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Phase 2 
 
1.00 -0.50 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Phase 3 
  
1.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Nucleolus 
   
1.00 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Shapley 
    
1.00 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
WCM-Power 
     
1.00 -0.25 -0.25 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
WCM-
Initiator       
1.00 -0.25 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
ECM 
       
1.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Manufacturer 
        
1.00 -0.50 -0.50 
LSP 
         
1.00 -0.50 
Retailer 
          
1.00 
 Figure 3: Acceptance levels of each of the three parties for the business practitioners and the control 
group 
 
In Figure 4 the acceptance levels of each of the five different gain sharing methods in each of the 
three different phases for the business practitioners and the control group are displayed. For both 
groups the Nucleolus, the baseline, has the smallest acceptance rate with 44.44 % for the business 
practitioners and 56.21 % for the control group. This is also observed by the logistic regression, see 
Table 5. All gain sharing methods show a positive coefficient indicating that all methods compared to 
the baseline have a higher acceptance rate. However, only the ECM for the business practitioners 
and the Shapley value, the WCM-Power and the ECM for the control group show a significant 
increase in the acceptance levels. The most accepted method differs; the business practitioners 
prefer with an acceptance rate of 66.66 % the ECM and the control group prefers the Shapley value 
with an acceptance rate of 71.24 %. Taken the phases into account, no significant difference between 
the phases is observed for the business practitioners, see Table 5. On the contrary, for the control 
group a significant decrease in the acceptance levels of Phase 2 in comparison to Phase 1 is 
identified, see Table 5.  
 
Figure 4: Acceptance levels for the five different gain sharing methods and the three different phases 
for the business practitioners and the control group 
 
 
Table 5: Logistic regression output for the regression of the business practitioners and the control 
group 
 Business Practitioners Control Group 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Intercept -.242 .633 .515 .029 
Shapley .474 .399 .750 .004 
WCM-Power .790 .161 .508 .045 
WCM-Initiator .317 .574 .154 .535 
ECM 1.274 .025 .644 .012 
Phase 2 -.287 .512 -.465 .019 
Phase 3 -.096 .827 .039 .848 
LSP 1.769 .000 .768 .000 
Retailer -1.564 .000 -1.058 .000 
 
 
4.3 Regression Manufacturer 
In this section, the results of the acceptance levels for the manufacturers are presented. In Figure 5 
the acceptance levels for the five different gain sharing methods in each of the three different phases 
are displayed for the business practitioners and the control group. For the manufacturers, the total 
acceptance rate of the control group is with 68.24 % significantly higher compared to the acceptance 
rate of the business practitioners with 55 %. Both, the business practitioners and the control group, 
show differences in the acceptance levels between the methods. Moreover, both groups display an 
increase in the acceptance from the Nucleolus to the ECM. Therefore, the Nucleolus is the least 
accepted method with an acceptance level of 8.33 % for the business practitioners and 25.49 % for 
the control group. The most accepted method with an acceptance level of 100 % for the business 
practitioners and 96.08 % for the control group is the ECM. In Table 6 the results of the logistic 
regression are presented. A significant increase in the acceptance level of the gain sharing methods 
compared to the baseline is identified for the business practitioners and the control group. 
Furthermore, a significant influence of the information availability on the acceptance levels of the 
business practitioners is observed. Compared to Phase 1, the acceptance levels in Phase 2 and Phase 
3 are significantly lower, with the lowest acceptance rate in Phase 2. For the control group a 
significant negative influence on the acceptance level even on a 1 % significance level is observed for 
Phase 2.   
 Figure 5: Acceptance levels of the five different gain sharing methods and three different phases for 
the manufacturer 
 
Table 6: Logistic regression output for the manufacturers 
 Business Practitioners 
- Manufacturers - 
Control Group 
- Manufacturers - 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Intercept -.944 .292 -.929 .395 
Shapley 2.355 .037 2.183 .000 
WCM-Power 3.239 .003 2.299 .000 
WCM-Initiator 3.665 .001 3.402 .000 
ECM 6.517 .000 5.056 .000 
Phase 2 -3.152 .000 -1.851 .000 
Phase 3 -2.171 .015 .619 .179 
 
 
4.4 Regression LSP 
In this section, the results of the logistic regression for the LSPs are presented. In Figure 6 the 
acceptance levels for the five different gain sharing methods in each of the three different phases are 
displayed for the business practitioners and the control group. The control group has with 81.57 % a 
lower total acceptance level compared to the business practitioners with 88.33 %. For the business 
practitioners, acceptance levels of 83.33 % and higher for the different gain sharing methods are 
identified. The same holds for the control group. Except of the Nucleolus with an acceptance level of 
68.63 %, acceptance levels of 80.39 % and higher are observed. For the business practitioners and 
the control group differences in the acceptance levels between the phases are observed. A significant 
influence of the information availability on the acceptance levels of both groups is identified on a 10 
% significance level. Another interesting finding is the positive influence of the information 
availability for the business practitioners and the negative influence for the control group. Moreover, 
for the control group a significant influence of the method on the acceptance levels compared to the 
Nucleolus is identified for all gain sharing methods except of the WCM-Power on a 10 % significance 
level. 
 
Figure 6: Acceptance levels of the five different gain sharing methods and three different phases for 
the LSP 
 
Table 7: Logistic regression output for the LSPs 
 Business Practitioners 
- LSPs - 
Control Group 
- LSPs - 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Intercept .296 .719 1.407 .001 
Shapley .710 .553 1.081 .035 
WCM-Power .710 .553 .646 .170 
WCM-Initiator .000 1.000 .922 .063 
ECM .710 .553 1.467 .009 
Phase 2 2.757 .010 -.848 .059 
Phase 3 1.644 .050 -.920 .039 
 
 4.5 Regression Retailer 
In this section, the results of the retailer logistic regression are discussed. In Figure 7 the acceptance 
rates of the five different gain sharing methods in each of the three different phases are displayed for 
the business practitioners and the control group. In total, the retailers have a low acceptance level. 
Moreover, the business practitioners show a significantly lower acceptance rate with 20 % compared 
to the control group with 43.53 % even on a 1 % significance level. For both groups, the retailers 
show a decrease in the acceptance from the Nucleolus to the ECM, with the lowest acceptance rate 
for the WCM-Initiator with no acceptance at all for the business practitioners and 9.8 % for the 
control group. The highest acceptance rate can be assigned to the Nucleolus for both groups. The 
acceptance level for the Nucleolus with 74.51 % for the control group is greater compared to the 
business practitioners with 41.67 %. For the business practitioners, a significant decrease in the 
acceptance rate compared to the Nucleolus is identified for the WCM-Initiator and the ECM on a 10 
% significance level, see Table 8. For the control group, a significant decrease is detected for all 
methods except for the Shapley value. In total, no significant influence of the phases is observed for 
the business practitioners and the control group, see Table 8.   
 
Figure 7: Acceptance levels of the five different gain sharing methods and three different phases for 
the retailer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Logistic regression output for the retailers 
 Business Practitioners 
- Retailers - 
Control Group 
- Retailers - 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Intercept -.296 .675 .769 .041 
Shapley -.659 .418 -.642 .138 
WCM-Power -.659 .418 -1.047 .015 
WCM-Initiator -2.830 .014 -3.328 .000 
ECM -1.666 .075 -2.393 .000 
Phase 2 .000 1.000 .571 .112 
Phase 3 .000 1.000 .381 .287 
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
5.1 Result Discussion 
The results showed that the acceptance of gain sharing methods is influenced by the information 
availability and cognitive biases. The manufacturer is significantly negative influenced by the 
information availability for all phases except for Phase 3 for the control group. For both groups, a 
significant negative influence has been observed for Phase 2 even on a 1 % significance level. In this 
phase, the manufacturers received the information that normally the lowest gain share has been 
assigned to them omitting the fact that they are the smallest player in the supply chain. Last 
information was only provided in Phase 3. This information increased the acceptance level compared 
to Phase 2; nevertheless, the acceptance level of Phase 3 is below the one of Phase 1. Moreover, 
results indicated a higher acceptance level of the control group compared to the business 
practitioners due to a higher acceptance level for the Nucleolus. The Nucleolus assigns a gain share 
of 4,333.33 € to the manufacturer. This gain share is higher than the manufacturer's contribution 
with -5,000 €. However, the business practitioners did not accept this method. Apart from one 
manufacturer who accepted the Nucleolus in Phase 1, the method was rejected. Considering the 
higher acceptance level of the control group, an impact of cognitive biases can be assumed for the 
business practitioners. The manufacturers had to invest the highest amount to start the SCC, see 
Table 2. Taken this into account, the manufacturer's reason for rejecting the gain sharing methods 
might be the small portion of the gain that cannot justify the costs and efforts. The LSPs have the 
highest acceptance rates. The acceptance level of the business practitioners amounts to 88.33 % 
which is larger than the acceptance level of the control group. This can be explained by the influence 
of one cognitive bias, the so-called choice-supportive bias (Mather and Johnson, 2000). The LSPs are 
usually the party initiating to start the SCC in the Dutch FMCG industry. Therefore, no matter what 
gain share is assigned, the LSPs always show a high acceptance level. Further results indicate that the 
LSPs were positively influenced by information availability, whereas, the control group was 
negatively affected. Especially, for the WCM-Initiator a low acceptance level in Phase 2 and Phase 3 
has been observed for the control group. The amount the LSPs received according to this method 
was the highest one. However, due to the low acceptance rate it is assumed that this amount has not 
been perceived as fair. The intention of the gain sharing method, namely that the party initiating to 
start the SCC receives the highest gain share, was not communicated. Moreover, it was not 
communicated that the LSP is the party who most of the time took the initiative to start the SCC. This 
might enhance the perception of unfairness. These findings indicate the importance of providing all 
relevant information. For the retailer, no significant influence of information availability has been 
identified. Further, a very low acceptance level with 20 % for the business practitioners and 43.53 % 
for the control group has been identified. Moreover, a significant difference in the acceptance levels 
between the business practitioners and the control group has been detected even on a 1 % 
significance level. The acceptance level of the control group was more than twice of the business 
practitioners. The low acceptance rate of the two groups can be explained by the retailer's high 
contribution to the coalition gain combined with a lower gain according to all gain sharing methods, 
see Table 2 and Table 3. The significant difference between the business practitioners and the 
control group even on a 1 % significance level as well as the missing influence of information 
availability on the acceptance levels indicate an additional influence of cognitive biases. One 
explanation might be the power of the retailers in the Dutch FMCG supply chain, identified by Jung et 
al. (2017b). Taking into account the power position of the retailers, this party might demand a bigger 
portion of the gain. Tijs and Driessen (1986) also outline that the choice of the method depends on 
the power feeling of the participants. The WCM-Power already considers the power position of a 
party; the highest weight was assigned to the retailers. However, the acceptance level of this method 
was also low. Based on this result, it is assumed that the weight did not represent the power of the 
retailer in the Dutch FMCG industry. 
Due to the different influence of information availability and varying cognitive biases, no gain sharing 
method is preferred by all parties involved in the SCC. The manufacturers preferred the ECM with an 
acceptance level of 100 %. On the contrary, the retailers had a clear preference with 41.67 % for the 
Nucleolus and the LSPs were indifferent between the Shapley value, the WCM-Power and the ECM. 
Except for the LSPs the same preferences were identified for the control group. The LSPs of the 
control group had a slight preference for the ECM. These findings demonstrate the challenge of 
applying a gain sharing method that is accepted by all parties involved in the SCC which is essential 
for the implementation and the success of a SCC (Cruijssen et al., 2007a; Cruijssen et al., 2007b; 
Cruijssen, 2012; Leng and Parlar, 2009). Further, only small differences between the acceptance 
levels of the gain sharing methods for all parties together could be identified and the acceptance 
levels were far from 100 %. The business practitioners have with an acceptance level of 66.67 % a 
slight preference for the ECM. On the contrary, the control group has with an acceptance level of 
71.24 % a slight preference for the Shapley value. These findings confirm the result from literature 
that there exists no one preferred gain sharing method (Tijs and Driessen, 1986; Vanovermeire et al., 
2014b).  
 
5.2 Theoretical Implications 
This paper is an extension of the work by Cruijssen et al. (2007a) and Leng and Parlar (2009). In their 
paper, Cruijssen et al. (2007a) identified the need for a fair gain allocation for the implementation 
and the success of horizontal SCCs. In the context of vertical SCC, Leng and Parlar (2009) confirmed 
the importance of a fair allocation method for parties to stay in the SCC. Although the acceptance of 
and satisfaction with a gain sharing method is necessary for a sustainable SCC, until now the 
acceptance of these gain sharing methods in practice has not been identified. Therefore, this paper 
enriches the SCM literature through the investigation of the acceptance levels of selected gain 
sharing methods in practice. Another contribution to the SCM literature is the integration of 
behavioural decision-making literature. The predominant assumption for a long time was that 
decision-makers are rational thinking agents. However, decision-makers are human beings and, 
therefore, the decision is influenced by the bounded rationality and cognitive biases (Schenk, 2011; 
Sterman, 1989; Simon, 1979). To ensure practical validity, it is necessary to incorporate behavioural 
research in studies (Tokar, 2010). In this paper, behavioural aspects were taken into account and, 
therefore, novel insights in the understanding of the acceptance of different gain sharing methods 
are provided. The influence of behavioural aspects such as information availability and cognitive 
biases on the acceptance of gain sharing methods has been identified.   
 
5.3 Practical implications 
Results showed that providing the same information to all parties involved in the SCC would lead to 
no preferred gain sharing method. As stated by Cruijssen et al. (2007a), a gain sharing method which 
is perceived as fair and is accepted by all parties involved in the SCC is crucial for the implementation 
and the success of the SCC. Therefore, one practical implication to overcome the barrier would be to 
provide all relevant information to each party individually. Further, differences between the business 
practitioners and the control group indicated the influence of various cognitive biases. Cognitive 
biases influence our rational behaviour resulting in unpredictable decisions (Schenk, 2011). 
Therefore, in order to increase the predictability of the behaviour, one idea based on research by Soll 
et al. (2015) is to apply so-called debiasing-techniques. One debiasing-technique is to provide all 
relevant information packaged in an intuitively comprehensible and compelling format. A suggestion 
would be to show a figure which provides the information about the allocation of the gain.           
 
5.4 Further Research 
The present research offers several opportunities for further research. In the study, the participants 
of the online survey were all coming from one Dutch industry. Further research should include other 
geographical areas and/or a broader range of industries. Moreover, the participants of the online 
survey were confronted with only one specific artificial situation and no incentives were provided. 
Conducting the online survey in a real-life situation could identify other important behavioural 
decision-making aspects. Furthermore, additional gain sharing methods and weights should be 
considered. In the study four selected gain sharing methods have been tested; further research 
should also include gain sharing methods like the EPM or the WRSM in the survey. Only two weights 
were taking into account in the survey and the weights were determined based on interviews.  For 
the retailer it has been identified that the chosen weight for the WCM-Power is not representing the 
reality. Further research should take into account also other important aspects of the FMCG industry 
and/or other industries as well as vary the weights assigned to the different parties. Finally, only a 
few behavioural decision-making aspects were taken into account and debiasing techniques have 
been proposed but not applied. Further research should also take into account other aspects. One 
example is the availability of time, which is another component of the bounded rationality 
mentioned by Simon (1979). The lack of available time force people to use heuristics or cognitive 
biases (Schenk, 2011; Simon, 1979), therefore, it is important to also include the availability of time 
in future surveys. Furthermore, debiasing techniques should be tested in practice. In total, it could be 
identified that due to the different influence of information availability and varying cognitive biases 
no gain sharing method is accepted by and satisfies all parties involved in a SCC. Further gain sharing 
methods should focus more on the participants' acceptance and satisfaction of the gain sharing 
methods. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A  
 
The preliminary study consisted of 20 companies including 7 manufacturers, 6 LSPs and 7 retailers 
from the Dutch FMCG industry. All these companies were also participating in the logistics 
competition, which is observed in this paper. For the data collection individual, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted mostly face-to-face with the supply chain managers from the companies. 
The following questions concerning the gain sharing methods were asked to the interviewees:  
 What does "fair gain sharing" mean for you and your company? 
 To what extend are you willing to share gains among the entire supply chain? (answer on a 5-
point Likert scale) 
 Would it be a problem for your company to share gains that are captured by your company, 
but are a result of a collaboration project with other parties involved? To what extend and 
why? 
 If so, why are you willing to share gains? Mention your TOP 5. 
 In your experience, how do other parties within your project/supply chain react to gain 
sharing? 
 Before you start a collaboration project, is the transparency of how much each party needs 
to invest in collaboration projects an important issue? 
 Before you are staring a collaboration project, is it crucial information for you to know how 
parties will benefit? To what extend and why? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B  
In the following an example of the online survey is presented. This is an online survey for a 
participant of the control group. The role of the participant is assigned to party A (manufacturer).  
 
Figure B.1: Example of the online survey 
 
Figure B.2: Example of the online survey 
 
Figure B.3 to Figure B.5 show examples for the part of the online survey belonging to Phase 1. In 
Figure B.5 an example for the question in Phase 1 is shown. In the online survey in total five 
questions were asked; one for each gain sharing method. 
 Figure B.3: Example of the online survey 
 
 
 
Figure B.4: Example of the online survey 
 Figure B.5: Example of the online survey 
 
Figure B.6 and Figure B.7 show examples for the part of the online survey belonging to Phase 2. In 
Figure B.7 an example for the question in Phase 2 is shown. In the online survey in total five 
questions were asked; one for each gain sharing method. 
 
 
Figure B.6: Example of the online survey 
 
 
 Figure B.7: Example of the online survey 
 
 
Figure B.8 to Figure B.10 show examples for the part of the online survey belonging to Phase 3. In 
Figure B.10 an example for the question in Phase 3 is shown. In the online survey in total five 
questions were asked; one for each gain sharing method. 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.8: Example of the online survey 
 
 
Figure B.9: Example of the online survey 
 
 
Figure B.10: Example of the online survey 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C  
In the following tables, the correlation matrices for all performed logistic regressions are shown. 
Table C.1 presents the correlation matrices of the business practitioners and Table C.2 and Table C.3 
the correlation matrices of the control group. 
 
Table C.1: Correlation matrix of the manufacturer, the LSP and the retailer regression of the business 
practitioners 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Nucleolus Shapley WCM-
Power 
WCM-
Initiator 
ECM 
Phase 1 1.00 -0.50 -0.50 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Phase 2 
 
1.00 -0.50 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Phase 3 
  
1.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Nucleolus 
   
1.00 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 
Shapley 
    
1.00 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 
WCM-Power 
     
1.00 -0.25 -0.25 
WCM-Initiator 
      
1.00 -0.25 
ECM 
       
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C.2: Correlation matrix of the regression of the control group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Phase 
1 
Phase 
2 
Phase 
3 
Nucleolus Shapley WCM-
Power 
WCM-
Initiator 
ECM Manufac-
turer 
LSP Retailer 
Phase 1 1.00 -0.50 -0.50 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Phase 2 
 
1.00 -0.50 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Phase 3 
  
1.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Nucleolus 
   
1.00 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Shapley 
    
1.00 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
WCM-Power 
     
1.00 -0.25 -0.25 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
WCM-
Initiator       
1.00 -0.25 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
ECM 
       
1.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
Manufacturer 
        
1.00 -0.50 -0.50 
LSP 
         
1.00 -0.50 
Retailer 
          
1.00 
Table C.3: Correlation matrix of the manufacturer, the LSP and the retailer regression of the control 
group 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Nucleolus Shapley WCM-
Power 
WCM-
Initiator 
ECM 
Phase 1 1.00 -0.50 -0.50 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Phase 2 
 
1.00 -0.50 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Phase 3 
  
1.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Nucleolus 
   
1.00 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 
Shapley 
    
1.00 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 
WCM-Power 
     
1.00 -0.25 -0.25 
WCM-Initiator 
      
1.00 -0.25 
ECM 
       
1.00 
 
 
